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A NEW EU BUSINESS COMBINATION FORM TO
FACILITATE CROSS-BORDER M&A: THE COMPULSORY
SHARE EXCHANGE
LUCA ENRIQUES*
ABSTRACT
Facilitating cross-border mergers and acquisitions has long been one
of the objectives of European company law directives and regulations.
This short essay shows that the current European legal framework
unnecessarily raises the transaction costs incurred when the acquirer
aims both to obtain one hundred percent of a company’s shares and to
preserve the acquired company as a separate entity. Higher transaction
costs result from the limited availability of the squeeze-out right. Instead
of proposing to extend such right, which would be politically contentious,
the solution proposed here is for a directive requiring member states to
allow companies to execute acquisition transactions via a ‘compulsory
share exchange.’ This is a transaction form in which the acquiring and
the target companies agree that the target shareholders will receive shares
in the acquiring company in exchange for their shares. This essay will
show that a subset of the rules applying to cross-border mergers would be
sufficient to regulate such transactions.
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INTRODUCTION

A long-standing and persistent aspiration of European law has
been to facilitate cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Various
European Union directives and regulations regarding companies
and taxes have been adopted for this purpose in the last three
decades, from the Merger Tax Directive of 1990 and its subsequent
amendments1 to the European Company Statute2 and the CrossBorder Merger Directive.3
However, the process to be followed to execute a cross-border
merger can be cumbersome and costly,4 discouraging at least some
potential M&A transactions. This discouragement is especially the
case with mergers between a company incorporated in a
jurisdiction providing for worker representation on the Board of
1 Council Directive 90/434, on the Common System of Taxation Applicable
to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares Concerning
Companies of Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EC), as later amended
and then codified in Council Directive 2009/133, on the Common System of
Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Partial Divisions, Transfers of Assets
and Exchanges of Shares Concerning Companies of Different Member States and
to the Transfer of the Registered Office of an SE or SCE between Member States,
2009 O.J. (L 310) 34 (EC) [hereinafter Merger Tax Directive].
2 Council Regulation 2157/2001, on the Statute for a European Company
(SE), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2001/86, Supplementing the
Statute for a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees,
2001 O.J. (L 294) 22 (EC).
3 Council Directive 2005/56, on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability
Companies, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Cross-Border Merger Directive].
In addition, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice
decisions on golden shares have lowered political obstacles to cross-border
mergers. See, e.g., Wolf-Georg Ringe, Company Law and Free Movement of Capital,
69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 378 (2010). Unfortunately, the same positive impact cannot be
attributed to the Takeover Bids Directive, Council Directive 2004/25, on Takeover
Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Takeover Bids Directive], which might
have facilitated bids in the version originally proposed by the Commission, but
ended up designing a framework less favorable to bidders than the pre-existing
one. See Paul Davies et al., The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?, in
COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM: NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 105, passim (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2010) (showing
that, as an outcome of the Takeover Bids Directive, national takeover laws have
become less favorable to takeovers than before); Luca Enriques, European Takeover
Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 623, 627–31 (2011)
(showing how the Takeover Bids Directive contains a number of provisions
hindering takeovers and much fewer promoting them).
4 See, e.g., Paul Storm, Scope and Limitations of the Cross-border Merger Directive,
in 1 CROSS-BORDER MERGERS IN EUROPE 54, 75 (Dirk Van Gerven ed., 2010)
(describing the obstacles to executing cross-border mergers pursuant to the CrossBorder Merger Directive).
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Directors and one incorporated in a jurisdiction that does not
provide for the same level of employee participation. Such
companies have to engage in potentially lengthy labor
negotiations, with parties bargaining in the shadow of pro-labor
rules that will govern if no deal can be struck.5 The justification for
such worker protection measures is to ensure that cross-border
mergers are not mechanisms used by companies to get rid of codetermination imposed by their jurisdictions.
Well aware that “a number of issues have been identified as a
potential source of uncertainty and complexity,” the European
Commission plans to consider “the appropriateness of
amendments to the Directive on cross-border mergers.”6
The purpose of this essay is to show that, as a complement to
well-advised efforts at simplifying the current regime for crossborder mergers, a business combination form well-known in U.S.
corporate law, the compulsory share exchange, could be made
available to all European companies to facilitate cross-border M&A
activity.
In a compulsory share exchange,7 the acquiring company
would offer to exchange its own shares for shares of the target that
it does not already own. The difference between this transaction
form and a share-for-share tender offer would be that the target
and the acquiring companies’ shareholder meetings would vote on
the transaction and, if approved, even the dissenting target’s
shareholders would participate in the exchange. As a result of the
transaction, the target company shareholders would become
shareholders of the acquiring company (in a measure determined
according to the exchange ratio approved by both companies) and
the acquiring company would obtain one hundred percent of the
acquired company’s shares.

5 See, e.g., Mathias M. Siems, The European Directive on Cross-Border Mergers:
An International Model?, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 167, 177-78 (2005) (showing that, in
the case where no deal is struck with employee representatives, the applicable
rules are favorable to labor).
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action
Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A Modern Legal Framework
for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, at 12–13, COM (2012) 740
final (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0740:FIN:EN:PDF.
7 For a more in-depth discussion of the mechanics of the compulsory share
exchange, see infra Part 2.
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Because a compulsory share exchange, as explained below,
would leave worker (and creditor) rights unscathed, lawmakers
may regulate this business combination form without requiring
companies to undergo some of the cumbersome procedural steps
that are currently mandated for cross-border mergers.
To understand why a similar business combination form
would be useful, let us categorize M&A transactions into three
categories depending on the degree of economic and legal
integration between the combined entities that the acquiring party
is interested in achieving.
If the acquiring party only intends to gain control over a
company situated in another member state, all it has to do is
acquire a majority of its shares, whether through private
negotiations (followed by a mandatory bid if the acquired
company is listed and the relevant ownership threshold is
crossed8) or via a voluntary offer for all or a majority of the shares
(again, in the latter case, followed by a mandatory bid for the
remaining shares, if the mandatory bid threshold is crossed). We
can call this first category of transactions partial acquisitions:
though the acquirer, due to mandatory bid obligations in listed
companies or tag-along clauses in the privately held company
setting, may end up with one hundred percent of the shares, the
acquirer’s main goal is to achieve a majority (or even a working
control) stake.
In other instances, the acquirer aims to gain complete control
over the acquired company, i.e., to end up with one hundred
percent of the shares. The acquirer may want total control for a
variety of reasons. One hundred percent ownership at the
subsidiary level rules out the possibility of conflicts of interest with
minority shareholders, and therefore any kind of limitations to
parent-subsidiary transactions arising from minority shareholder
protection rules.9 It also rules out any other possibly costly

8 See Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 3, at art. 5 (providing that
purchasers of a block of shares granting control of a listed company have to
launch a tender offer for the remaining shares at the highest price paid for them).
9 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 468 (4th ed. 2012) (“To acquire a corporation in the full
sense of obtaining complete dominion over its assets, an acquirer must purchase
100 percent of its target’s stock, not merely a control block.”).
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intrusions in the subsidiary’s management via the exercise of
minority rights by a vociferous holding-out shareholder.10
In the same circumstances, it may also be the case that the
acquirer cannot, or would rather not, achieve one hundred percent
ownership via a merger of the acquirer company and the target.
Such a merger might be too difficult to execute or excessively
costly. For example, a strong creditor may have a covenant
granting it a veto over change-of-control transactions and gaining
its consent may be costlier in the event of a full-blown merger. The
merger may also have negative tax consequences: in fact, the
Merger Tax Directive has only partially achieved tax neutrality so
far.11 In addition, maintaining a wholly owned subsidiary may be
politically sensitive; for instance, in a situation where nationalistic
opposition mounts against the M&A transaction, preservation of
the national entity would ease political concerns. Maintaining a

10 The acquirer may also aim to appropriate all the increased profits deriving
from its improved management of the acquired entity (whether due to better
managerial skills or to synergies with the acquirer’s pre-existing business) to the
exclusion of the pre-acquisition shareholders.
This may be possible in
jurisdictions allowing the squeeze-out of minorities at a price which does not
incorporate the efficiency gains from the acquisition. For the U.S. debate on the
issue, compare Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 322–40 (1974) (advocating equal
distribution of synergy gains between acquirer and minority shareholders of the
acquired corporation) with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 729 (1982) (providing an efficiency rationale
for a rule allowing the acquirer to appropriate all gains from the acquisition by
squeezing out minorities at the pre-acquisition share price). The compulsory
share exchange proposed here may allow the acquirer to attain such an objective,
but this will depend on whether the valuation of the target’s shares for the
purposes of the exchange ratio incorporates the post-acquisition value of the
combined entity. On this issue, EU corporate law is silent. In fact, Council
Directive 2011/35, Concerning Mergers of Public Limited Liability Companies,
2011 O.J. (L 110) 1 (EU) [hereinafter the Merger Directive] only states that the
exchange ratio must be “fair and reasonable,” but does not specify what that
implies in respect of synergy gains. Id. at art. 10(2). The Cross-Border Merger
Directive also refers to Article 10(2) of the Merger Directive. See Cross-Border
Merger Directive, supra note 3, at art. 8(3) (citing Article 10(2) of the Merger
Directive as the guideline for requirements of independent expert reports for
shareholders). To be clear, the Cross-Border Merger Directive refers to the Merger
Directive’s predecessor, the Third Council Directive 78/855, Based on Article
54(3)(g) of the Treaty Concerning Mergers of Public Limited Liability Companies,
1978 O.J. (L 295) 36 (EC).
11 See, e.g., HARM VAN DEN BROEK, CROSS-BORDER MERGERS WITHIN THE EU:
PROPOSALS TO REMOVE THE REMAINING TAX OBSTACLES 325 (2012) (“In other words,
the Merger [Tax] Directive fails to neutralize all relevant tax burdens for crossborder mergers.”).
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separate subsidiary may have the advantage of leaving workers’
rights untouched and therefore allow the acquirer to skip labor
negotiations that, in the worst case scenario for the acquiring
company’s owners, may lead to extending labor participation
rights to its own employees. Further, the acquirer may want to
keep the acquired company’s liabilities separate from its own.12
And, finally, there may be national or EU rules requiring
notification to customers or other stakeholders of any change in the
identity of the supplier of goods or services, which is what
happens when the acquired company is merged into the acquiring
one or becomes part of a new entity via a merger.13 We can call
this second category of transactions—in which the acquirer aims at
total ownership but cannot, or would rather not, engage in a
merger— ‘one hundred percent acquisitions.’
Finally, there may be instances in which the acquirer pursues
not only one hundred percent ownership, but also complete
integration, including from a legal entity point of view. The
motivations may be tax-related, labor law-related,14 regulationrelated,15 or more broadly business-related. These instances make
up the third category: merger transactions.
This essay shows, first, that the current EU framework is illequipped to facilitate one hundred percent acquisitions. Acquirers
are pushed to either buy out hold-out minority shareholders at a
higher price or engage in a costlier cross-border merger. In either
case, the legal framework may prevent some cross-border merger
deals from going through. And it will impose higher transaction
costs on those deals that will go through all the same.
12 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 471 (discussing the mechanics of a
triangular merger, which allows an acquirer to limit its exposure to the target’s
liabilities “by merging the target into a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquirer”).
13 For instance, under German law, following a merger between two
insurance companies, policyholders of the merged entity have to be notified of the
merger by the merging company. See Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz [VAG]
[Insurance Supervision Act], Dec. 5, 1901, RGBl at 139, repromulgated Dec. 17,
1992, BGBl. I at 2, last amended by § 6(13), of Act of Aug. 28, 2013, BGBl. I at 3395,
§§ 14(7) & 14a (Ger.).
14 For instance, the participation rights of workers in the acquiring company
may suffer dilution once they have to be exercised together with the acquired
company’s workers, who may be less unionized and/or represented by less
confrontational unions. See Michael Stollt & Norbert Kluge, The Potential of
Employee Involvement in the SE to Foster the Europeanization of Labour Relations, 17
TRANSFER: EUR. REV. OF LAB. & RES. 181, 184 (2011).
15 For example, a financial institution may prefer to conduct business in the
target’s jurisdiction via a branch rather than via a subsidiary.
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A set of rules enabling companies to enter into a compulsory
share exchange, a business combination form hitherto unavailable
in most European jurisdictions, is thus proposed here to facilitate
one hundred percent acquisitions.
Part 2 describes the practical problems with one hundred
percent acquisitions and the compulsory share exchange solution
to them. Part 3 explains what rules would be necessary and
sufficient to ensure minority shareholders and other stakeholders
protection in compulsory share exchanges. Part 4 sums the essay
up.
2.

THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION

An acquirer interested in obtaining one hundred percent
ownership of the acquired company may have a hard time
achieving its goal.
If the target company is privately owned, a minority
shareholder may hold out and refuse to sell his or her shares to the
acquirer unless he or she receives a higher price than that offered
to other shareholders (which may lead all of them to hold out for a
higher price). The problem can be solved by entering into a merger
agreement with the target company, in which case a majority of
shareholders will force the minority shareholders to become
shareholders of the combined entity under the same conditions as
the majority.16 But, for the reasons explained in Part 1, a full-blown
merger transaction may not be an attractive, or even viable, route
for the acquirer.17
If the target company is listed, a minority shareholder or a
group of minority shareholders coordinating among themselves
may refrain from tendering their shares to the bidder. If the holdout shareholders own more than a given percentage of shares, the
acquiring company will not be able to squeeze them out, i.e., to
force them to sell their shares at a price usually equal to or not
much higher than the bid price. The threshold above which an
acquirer can force a squeeze-out is in fact very high: ninety or

16 This is assuming that the majority did not enter into any side deals with
the acquiring company. But that’s another story.
17 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text (explaining why a merger
transaction may not be a practicable solution for an acquirer aiming at onehundred percent of the target’s shares).
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ninety-five percent of the shares,18 depending on how member
states have implemented the Takeover Bids Directive.19
The only way to get rid of minority shareholders, other than
through a merger, would be to reach an agreement at a sufficiently
high price for the remaining shares. Whenever the situation is
such that the market knows that a merger is not a practical
solution, e.g., for political reasons, the likelihood of hold-outs by
shareholders aggregating more than five or ten percent of the
shares will be high. Anticipating this hold-out, the acquiring
company may make the bid conditional upon acceptance by
shareholders representing at least ninety or ninety-five percent of
the shares. But, even in that case, it may not be prohibitively costly
for a hedge fund to build a stake higher than five or ten percent
and negotiate better terms for all shareholders or (when this does
not violate the best price rule20) for itself alone.
Of course, an easy way to solve the problem outlined here
would be to make the squeeze-out remedy more easily available in
cases of acquisitions via a takeover bid. This could be done either
by lowering the ninety percent minimal threshold in the Takeover
Bids Directive, or by amending the Merger Directive21 and the
Cross-Border Merger Directive so as to make cash-out mergers
available under EU law, similar to the United States.22 The
18 For a more precise analysis of the thresholds in Article 15 of the Takeover
Bids Directive, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and
Reform Proposals, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 888–89 (2010).
19 A study covering twenty-one member states and all major EU jurisdictions
reports that the threshold is ninety percent in thirteen countries (including the
United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, and Sweden) and ninety-five percent in seven
(including Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands), with Romania having a
dual threshold based on both voting rights (ninety-five percent) and share capital
(ninety percent). See CHRISTOPHE CLERC ET AL., A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN TAKEOVER REGULATION 90 (2012). Note that Article 15 of
the Takeover Bids Directive prevents member states from setting a threshold
lower than ninety percent. See Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 3, at art. 15.
20 See Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 3, at art. 5(4) (requiring bidders to
extend to all offerees any price higher than the bid price paid during the offer).
21 See Merger Directive, supra note 10, at pmbl. (1) (stating that the Merger
Directive in its current form is the result of several amendments to prior Council
Directive 78/855).
22 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b), (c) (1974) (providing mechanics of
corporate mergers under Delaware law). To be sure, following a cash-out merger,
the target company would not survive as a separate entity; it would either be
merged into another entity or the other entity would have to merge into it. Often,
a wholly owned subsidiary is created for the purpose of executing a so-called
triangular merger so as not to expose the acquirer to the liabilities of the target.
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problem with this alternative solution is that, in Europe, the
squeeze-out remedy is highly controversial, with legal scholars on
the continent even doubting its consistency with constitutional
principles on takings of private property.23 A proposal to amend
the Takeover Bids Directive to lower the threshold for the squeezeout remedy, say, to seventy-five percent of the outstanding shares,
even if it went together with rules aimed to effectively rule out
pressure to tender in takeover bids,24 would hardly fly.25 Similarly,
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 9, at 471 (“[M]aintenance of the liability shield is the
premise for the triangular merger form.”). A separate entity is also retained if the
“share exchange” transaction form under the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act is used. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.02 (1983) (defining
the share exchange as a transaction with the same features as the compulsory
share exchange proposed here); id. at ch. 11 (regulating share exchanges the same
way as mergers). On the other side of the Atlantic, a more complex alternative,
which would only be available for companies incorporated in some European
jurisdictions (basically, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands), is the “duallisted structure,” of which Unilever and Reed Elsevier are examples. See PAUL L.
DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 1123 (9th ed. 2012) (explaining the complex arrangement of
managerial and shareholder bodies in “dual-listed structure” companies).
23 See Ventoruzzo, supra note 18, at 911 (“Most continental European systems
emphasize the property rights of the single shareholder over the shares she owns
and consider most forced acquisitions an infringement of the right to own
property. In some Member States, freeze-out statutory rights have even raised
constitutional law challenges on the grounds that they might be considered
unconstitutional takings based on private, rather than public, interests.”).
24 Pressure to tender is the collective action problem that target shareholders
face in the event of a coercive bid, i.e., a bid so structured that shareholders, being
unable to act collectively, may individually decide to tender their shares even
when they would rather see the bid fail. Shareholders do this for fear of ending
up holding minority shares that are worth even less than the pre-acquisition share
price, should the bid succeed despite their not tendering their shares. See, e.g.,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 911 (1987) (“In the face of a takeover bid, shareholders’ tender
decisions are subject to substantial distortions.”). At present, the mandatory bid
rule as designed in the Takeover Bids Directive does not work effectively to
release shareholders from pressure to tender, due to its unavailability in the event
of a voluntary bid for one hundred percent of the shares. See Luca Enriques, The
Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmonization Without Foundation?, 1
EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 440, 446–47 (2004).
25 See Christoph Van der Elst & Lientje Van den Steen, Opportunities in the
Merger and Acquisition Aftermarket: Squeezing Out and Selling Out, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: RESEARCH
AND ANALYSIS ON ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE SINCE 1990 191, 207 (Greg N. Gregoriou &
Luc Renneboog eds., 2007) (“[D]eviating from high thresholds could be judged as
contrary to the constitutional right of property protection.”). This position echoes
the influential view of the High Level Group (a group of company law experts set
up by the European Commission in 2001 to make recommendations on a modern
regulatory framework in the EU) in its Report on takeover bids. According to this
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the idea of cash-out mergers would raise the same kind of
opposition.
A compulsory share exchange would have the advantage of
putting the dissenting shareholders, once the transaction is
executed, in exactly the same position as shareholders dissenting
from a merger proposal.26 In other words, its effects (and, as
proposed below, its safeguards for minority shareholders) would
be the same as found in a merger, a business combination form
that is traditionally accepted and regulated within European
jurisdictions and by the EU itself.
Further, strictly as a matter of European law, simply lowering
the squeeze-out threshold in the Takeover Bids Directive would
not cover situations in which the acquiring company only becomes
interested in obtaining one hundred percent ownership well after
having gained partial control (for instance, because it would make
sense initially, if only for political reasons, to retain a local
shareholder base). In fact, the squeeze-out remedy in the Takeover
Bids Directive is limited to situations in which someone has
launched a bid to obtain control of the company; if a bid is
launched by someone already holding a majority of the shares, that
bid does not qualify as a takeover bid as defined by Article 1 in the
Directive, and hence Article 15 does not apply.27 The only
alternative in such a case would be to execute a full-blown merger.
Group, the squeeze-out right would be proportionate (i.e. legitimate), “[s]o long
as [it] applies only when the minority is fairly small . . . .” See Report of the High
Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, at 61 (Jan. 10,
2002),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/
takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf. A recent European Commission report
on the Takeover Bids Directive has not included the squeeze-out right among the
areas to be considered in a review of the Directive. See Report from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids,
at 9–11, COM (2012) 347 final (June 28, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/COM2012_347_en.pdf.
26 See infra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining why dissenting
shareholders in a compulsory share exchange are in the same position as
dissenting shareholders in a merger).
27 To be sure, member states have usually extended the squeeze-out right (or
an equivalent tool) either to all shareholders with a stake higher than the relevant
threshold or to all kinds of public offers (i.e., even those launched by someone
already controlling the company). See Christoph Van der Elst & Lientje Van den
Steen, Balancing the Interests of Minority and Majority Shareholders: A Comparative
Analysis of Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rights, 6 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 391, 394–99
(2009) (describing the applicable law in Belgium, France, the Netherlands,
Germany, and the United Kingdom).
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As anticipated, a different, and more politically palatable, way
to facilitate one hundred percent acquisitions would be for the EU
to make the compulsory share exchange available as a cross-border
M&A transaction form. At present, among European jurisdictions,
a similar business combination form is only available in the United
Kingdom and Ireland28 and limited to transactions involving
domestic companies.29 In the United Kingdom, what we call the
compulsory share exchange is known as a “transfer scheme”30 and
is regulated as a scheme of arrangement. This means it is subject to
rules that, according to British commentators, are overall less
cumbersome than those imposed by the Cross-Border Merger and
the Merger Directives.31
A compulsory share exchange can be described as a transaction
in which the acquiring company (A) and the target company (T)32
agree that all the shares in T that A does not already own will be
transferred to A, while T shareholders will receive shares in A in
an amount determined according to an agreed upon exchange
ratio.33 Other than in a tender offer, T shareholders would not
CLERC ET AL., supra note 19, at 92.
See Jennifer Payne, Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping
5 (University of Oxford, Legal Research Paper No. 68, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2277451 (stating that “schemes of arrangement”
affecting shareholder—as opposed to creditor—rights may only be used by
companies incorporated under UK law).
30 See LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 621 (2011) (explaining alternative schemes, including the
“transfer scheme”).
31 Schemes of arrangement need to be approved by a very high majority
(three quarters of the shares and a majority in number of shareholders) and are
subject to court approval. However, the disclosure requirements are less broad
and there is no need for an independent expert report. See DAVIES &
WORTHINGTON, supra note 22, at 1108–15.
32 Of course, a compulsory share exchange may also be used to execute what
is known as a ‘(non)merger of equals.’ In other words, it would also work for
combinations involving two companies of similar size with dispersed
shareholders, where the two companies survive as separate entities. In this
situation, it makes little sense, when looking at substance, to talk about an
acquiring and a target company.
33 One may also imagine a triangular transaction in which A offers shares in
one of its affiliates in exchange, while acquiring T shares itself. Of course, in such
a case the rules protecting shareholders identified in Part 3 will apply to protect
the interests of minority shareholders in A’s subsidiary in the unlikely case that
any exist. Also, following the British experience with schemes of arrangement,
the transaction may also be executed by cancelling the T shares A does not
already own, issuing an equal amount of shares in favor of A, and having T
shareholders other than A receive shares in A, which may have tax advantages if
28
29
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have a choice on whether to accept A’s offer; acceptance or
rejection would in fact be collective, in the form of an approval by
the shareholder meeting of T (and A). Other than in a merger, once
the transaction is executed, T would survive as a newly one
hundred percent-owned subsidiary of A.
In friendly acquisition settings, the compulsory share exchange
can work as a single-step transaction, where the acquiring
company approaches the target management (or controlling
shareholders) and a business combination of this kind is agreed
upon. In hostile acquisition settings, the acquirer may use the
compulsory share exchange, duly anticipated in the offering
document, as a second-step transaction to be executed once control
is obtained via a takeover. In either case, minority shareholders
have no choice but to become shareholders of the acquiring
company, unless of course company law either grants them the
power to block the transaction via special quorum requirements for
business combinations and/or for related party transactions, or
protects them via appraisal/withdrawal rights.
Part 3 explains why a subset of the rules applicable to (crossborder) mergers would be sufficient to protect all of the relevant
stakeholders of T and A in the event of a compulsory share
exchange.
3.

WHAT A COMPULSORY SHARE EXCHANGE DIRECTIVE WOULD
LOOK LIKE

The EU may facilitate one hundred percent cross-border
acquisitions by making the compulsory share exchange an
available tool for European companies engaging in cross-border
M&A. Due to the limited objective of this essay, we assume in the
following that all rules in the Takeover Bids and the Cross-Border
Merger Directives are necessary and sufficient to protect the
interests of the relevant stakeholders in the given circumstances.34
a stamp duty (or possibly a financial transaction tax) applies. See GULLIFER &
PAYNE, supra note 30, at 621.
34 Of course, this is not the case. One may indeed question the usefulness of
some of the rules on mergers and raise doubts about their effectiveness in
protecting minority shareholders’ interests, especially in the case of parentsubsidiary mergers. See Marieke Wyckaert & Koen Geens, Cross-Border Mergers
and Minority Protection: An Open-Ended Harmonization, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 40 (2008).
What matters here is that, first, if the European Union simplified the rules on
mergers, such simplifications should extend to compulsory share exchanges.
Second, if member states may impose stricter requirements to protect (minority)
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A European directive on compulsory share exchanges would
be very simple to devise. As articulated below, it would be enough
to identify the rules among those applicable to cross-border
mergers (and takeover bids) that, given the analogies, should apply
to compulsory share exchanges as well.
Note, first, that the position of shareholders dissenting from the
proposal to make the compulsory share exchange offer (in the case
of company A) or accept the offer (in the case of company T)
would be no different from that of shareholders dissenting from a
merger resolution.35 The outcome would be practically the same;
the fact that T survives after the transaction as a wholly-owned
subsidiary is of little or no relevance to the cash-flow rights and
voting rights of the shareholders involved. As a matter of fact,
even immediately after a merger is complete, nothing prevents
management from separating out T’s assets into a wholly-owned
subsidiary. It would be costly to do, of course, and never
necessary if the compulsory share exchange tool was available.
But, the fact that management might do so without triggering any
kind of EU corporate law protection for minority shareholders
shows that this situation, by assumption,36 is of no concern to
minority shareholders.37

shareholders in mergers, they should be able to do so with regard to compulsory
share exchanges as well. See Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at art.
4(2).
35 In fact, much like dissenting shareholders in a merger have no choice but
to become shareholders of the combined entity, shareholders dissenting from the
compulsory exchange resolution will similarly be forced to become shareholders
of the acquiring company. It follows that member states that grant shareholders
dissenting from a merger proposal withdrawal or appraisal rights should extend
such protections also to shareholders dissenting from a compulsory share
exchange proposal.
36 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing how, despite the
assumptions made in this essay, stakeholders are in fact not adequately protected
by current EU laws).
37 In fact, there might be instances in which creating a new subsidiary may be
just a preparatory step for the execution of related party transactions harming
minority shareholders. Separating assets in a different subsidiary may in fact
facilitate tunneling by making it harder for independent directors to police it, also
depending on domestic rules on related party transactions. The point here,
however, is only that a compulsory share exchange is no more dangerous than a
merger from this point of view. While in the former the assets remain segregated,
in the latter case, segregation could take place immediately after the merger and
be subject to no EU rule aimed to protect minority shareholders.
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Hence, the Cross-Border Merger Directive (and the Merger
Directive)38 rules aimed to protect shareholders would be—again,
presumptively39—necessary and sufficient to protect shareholders
in compulsory share exchanges. More precisely, the disclosure
obligations in the Cross-Border Merger Directive’s Articles 5 and 6,
because they also serve the purpose of informing shareholders
prior to the meeting,40 would also apply to compulsory share
exchanges.41 And the Cross-Border Merger Directive’s Articles 7 to
9, on the management report, the independent expert report, and
approval by the general meeting, respectively, would of course
apply.42
What about creditor interests? Because T would survive as a
separate entity following the transaction’s execution, there would
be no reason to extend merger creditor protection rules43 to
compulsory share exchanges. Existing creditors would retain their
right to seize T’s assets on a priority basis vis-à-vis A’s creditors.
The analogy here is with takeover bids. If the relevant directive
provides for no creditor protection tools in the event of a takeover
bid, then there is no reason to provide for such tools in a
compulsory share exchange.
More generally, because executing a compulsory share
exchange would not alter third party claims on T’s assets, there
38 See Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at art. 4(2) (declaring
domestic rules concerning the decision-making process relating to the merger
applicable to cross-border mergers, and hence, implicitly referring to the
additional protections contained in the Merger Directive).
39 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing how, despite the
assumptions made in this essay, stakeholders are in fact not adequately protected
by current EU laws).
40 Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at arts. 5–6. See id. at pmbl (5)
(clarifying the procedural publication requirements of Cross-Border Merger
Directive Article 6).
41 Of course not all items would be relevant in the case of a compulsory share
exchange. In Article 5, sub-sections (f), (i), and (k) presuppose a merger of the
relevant companies, while sub-section (j) presupposes the application of Article 16
on worker participation, which, as argued below, would not apply to compulsory
share exchanges. See Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at art. 5. On
sub-section (d), see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
42 Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at arts. 7–9. On the provisions
requiring that information be also given to workers’ representatives, see infra note
48 and accompanying text.
43 See Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at art. 4(2) (declaring
domestic rules concerning the protection of creditors of the merging companies
applicable to cross-border mergers, and hence implicitly referring to the
additional protections contained in the Merger Directive).
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would be no need to apply the Cross-Border Merger Directive
rules aimed at making third parties aware of and able to assess the
consequences of the merger on the relevant companies’ assets and
liabilities. Hence, Article 6, on publication of the draft terms of the
merger, and Article 13, on registration, should not be extended to
compulsory share exchanges.44 And those provisions providing
for legality control over the merger (Articles 10 and 11)45 should
only apply if it is held that such control is also undertaken in the
interests of shareholders.
Similarly, there would be no need to extend rules on worker
participation rights to such transactions (Article 16).46 If codetermination rules applied to T before the transaction, they would
continue to apply once the transaction was executed. If they
applied to A, but not to T, there would be no reason to extend them
to T because the rationale underlying Article 16 is to protect
existing co-determination rights rather than to increase the number
of employees who enjoy them.47
Under the initial assumption that existing European rules on
mergers and acquisitions are necessary to protect stakeholders’
interests, however, one may ask whether the (fairly innocuous)
labor-related disclosure obligations contained in the Takeover Bids

44
Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at arts. 6 & 13. Of course,
companies will have to comply with the EU’s legal formalities and publication
requirements regarding corporate statute amendments whenever issuance of
shares in favor of target shareholders requires amending the acquiring company’s
statute. See Directive 2012/30, on Coordination of Safeguards Which, for the
Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, Are Required by Member
States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 54 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in Respect of the Formation
of Public Limited Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of
Their Capital, with a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, art. 3, 2012 O.J.
(L 315) 74, 76 (EU) (setting forth information requirements for corporate
documents); Directive 2009/101, on Coordination of Safeguards Which, for the
Protection of the Interests of Members and Third Parties, Are Required by
Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of
Article 48 of the Treaty, with a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, art.
11, 2009 O.J. (L 258) 11, 16 (EC) (requiring that any amendments to corporate
documents “be drawn up and certified in due legal form”).
45 Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at arts. 10 & 11.
46 Id. at art. 16.
47 See, e.g., ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 206 (2d
ed. 2009) (explaining how rules dealing with employee participation rights in the
Cross-Border Merger Directive “protect existing participation rights when . . . a
cross-border merger takes place”).
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Directive,48 as partly reproduced in the Cross-Border Merger
Directive,49 will have to be extended to compulsory share
exchanges. This question highlights how arbitrary in their scope
such takeover bid provisions are: if workers need special
information rights in the event of a (prospective) change of control,
then they would also need such rights whether or not the target
shares are listed on a regulated market. However, for political
reasons alone, it may be wise to extend the relevant Cross-Border
Merger Directive rules to compulsory share exchanges as well.
Finally, there would be no need to extend the Takeover Bids
Directive rules on tender offers to compulsory share exchanges.
Structurally, the latter transactions are equivalent to a merger
transaction. The collective action problems arising in the context of
tender offers50 are by definition not an issue with a compulsory
share exchange; shareholders can either collectively reject the
transaction or collectively accept it.51
4.

SUMMING UP

This essay makes the case for the introduction, at the EU level,
of a new business combination form to facilitate cross-border
acquisitions—what we have called the compulsory share exchange.
If this business combination form was available, transactions
aimed to obtain one hundred percent control over another
company, while still preserving it as a separate legal entity, would
be facilitated, as the transaction costs arising from hold-out
behavior would be reduced (we cannot say eliminated, because
there might be cases in which, no differently than with mergers,
and depending on national rules on shareholder meeting quorums,

48 See Takeover Bids Directive, supra note 3, at arts. 6(1), 6(2), 6(3)(i), 8(2), &
9(5) (governing the procedural and substantive requirements concerning
disclosures that must be made to employees of the offeror and offeree companies
when a takeover bid is made).
49 See Cross-Border Merger Directive, supra note 3, at art. 5(d) (reproducing in
part Article 6(3)(i) of the Takeover Bids Directive, and Article 7, second
paragraph, corresponding, mutatis mutandis, to Articles 6(1), 6(2), 8(2), and 9(5) of
the Takeover Bids Directive).
50 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the pressure to tender
in takeover bids).
51 See Jennifer Payne, Minority Shareholder Protection in Takeovers: A UK
Perspective, 8 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 145, 158 (2011) (discussing the lack of
collective action problems under a scheme of arrangement since there is “no
opportunity for the bidder to divide and conquer”).
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a blocking minority may extract a higher price by using its veto
power over the transaction).
A directive on cross-border compulsory share exchanges could
be easily drafted by extending to such transactions the rules in the
Cross-Border Merger Directive that aim to protect shareholders.
For political reasons alone, it might be expedient to apply the
labor-oriented disclosure requirements found in the Takeover Bids
Directive to such transactions.
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